In Conversation | Aylin Matle

Germany, NATO, and the Burden-sharing Debate

The following conversation was recorded in September 2024 and has been edited for clarity. You can listen to the conversation here. 

Rick Landgraf: My guest today is Dr. Aylin Matle, who is a research fellow in the German Council on Foreign Relations Security and Defense Center. Her research areas include German security and defense policies, as well as Euro Atlantic security and defense matters. Aylin, welcome to the show.

Aylin Matle: Thanks for having me.

RL: The United States has long been concerned with what it perceives as unequal burden- sharing within the NATO alliance, with successive presidential administrations publicly and privately criticizing European allies for insufficient commitment to defense spending. So I'd like to ask you, Aylin, what have the European allies been doing since Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to address these US concerns over the imbalances of burden-sharing within the alliance?

AM: That's a great and very important question to start this kind conversation with. I would actually use 2014 as a sort of point of departure, which was the year of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and also the beginning of the war. Back then it was sort of a more covert operation conducted by Russia against Ukraine, or at least parts of Ukraine. But it made European allies more aware of changes in the security environment in Europe.

As a consequence, already back then, Europe started to address the issue of an imbalance of burden-sharing within NATO. And that resulted, over the past ten years now, in an increase in defense spending. While it might not be as much as the US, and not as fast as the US had wished for and expected, it is an amount of about $106 billion US dollars between 2014 and 2024, which equals roughly an increase of about 42 percent. I think there are a number of reasons as to why Europeans got their act together in that regard. 

First off, all NATO allies, not only Europeans, but also the US and Canada, made a pledge to each other in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their respective GDPs on defense by 2024. And only now, ten years later, in 2024, are 23 out of 32 NATO member states reaching that goal. In the years past, many countries, including my own country, Germany, were really far away from reaching that goal. So I think it stands to reason that it is partly due to pressure coming from the US, but also other European allies, especially in the Baltic States and also in Poland. But it is also because of the renewed invasion of Ukraine that Europeans are now spending more on defense matters and thereby addressing the burden-sharing question within NATO.

RL: As far as bringing it up to the Washington Summit this summer, the Wales pledge was made back in 2014. As you mentioned, two thirds of allies are now meeting that 2 percent goal. And the pledge was to meet that 2 percent by 2024. Here we are in 2024. The Washington Summit was in July. What new agreements did the allies make at the Washington Summit as far as investments in defense? Were any new pledges made?

AM: No, at least not with regards to the defense pledge. In the wake of the Washington Summit, there have been many recommendations floating around. Many conversations took place where this particular issue was discussed and there were a couple of countries, especially along the Eastern flank, who advocated to strengthen the language on the defense pledge, to renew the defense pledge, to actually put in writing that all allies should move way beyond the 2 percent goal. And while the Washington Summit declaration speaks of moving beyond the 2 percent goal, it doesn't specify what exactly that means. It's sort of left open to interpretation. Already back in 2023 at the Vilnius Summit, very similar language was put in the communique back then, recognizing that 2 percent was sufficient for a pre-2022 era, but it was not sufficient to meet the upended security environment, the dramatically changed security environment since February 2022. 

But those who stood up in favor of putting into the Washington Declaration 3 percent or 2.5 percent or even to a 3.5 percent, obviously failed when it came to negotiating the pledge. And I think you can point to a number of countries who were opposed to specifying that percent.

First and foremost, I would argue Germany is meeting the 2 percent target this year for the very first time. Berlin will struggle to continue meeting that target in the years to come. And I think most politicians, most decision makers across the board are keenly aware of that fact of that, or rather that problem, and thus were and continue to be reluctant to nail down a specific goal that moves beyond the 2 percent.

RL: And why is meeting the 2 percent goal so important for a country like Germany with its role in NATO and historic role within the European security architecture?

AM: I think it depends on who you ask and also the context. In 2024, it was of paramount importance to Germany, for German leaders, for German decision makers, to be able to point to the fact that Berlin is finally living up to its promises. And why is it so important in 2024—you alluded to this earlier—is that the US is in a very pivotal election year. I think it was very important not only for Germany, but also other European allies to sort of prove to lawmakers in the US across the board that they are serious about the pledges that they have made ten years ago, to convince them that Germany, but also other European allies are reliable allies. That they are allies the US should continue investing in because they are meeting their pledges, they're living up to their promises and expectations. So I think that's one part of the answer as to why it is so important in 2024 for Germany to show that it is a reliable ally. 

The other part to that answer can be found in the celebration year that NATO is in: 75 years of NATO is also quite a feat. And in a celebratory year, Germany does not want to be the ally that is failing to meet what it has promised to do for ten years, but it has failed to put into practice and action until now. 

All the political context aside, I think there's obviously also a geopolitical, security, and defense part to that answer. Also to answer why it is so important for Germany to meet this goal, not only this year, but hopefully in other years to come as well. And that obviously relates to Russia and to the security environment that Germany finds itself in alongside all of its other allies, not only since 2022, but I would argue since 2014. In 2022, most German lawmakers and decision makers have woken up to the reality that they already could have realized and delineated since 2014. I think there are various aspects as to why it is so important for Germany to meet the 2 percent in 2024.

RL: And regarding long-term assistance to Ukraine, and this is getting at burden-sharing from a different angle: What did the allies agree to, if anything, at the Washington Summit, as far as formalizing support to Ukraine?

AM: Well, one thing that allies could not agree on was to invite Ukraine to NATO

RL: And where does Germany stand on that right now from your perspective?

AM: Well, Germany is one of the opposing factors, one of the opposing allies. Germany is not ready yet, if ever, to extend a formal invitation to Ukraine in order for the country to join the alliance. Germany is not alone in that sort of opposition camp.The most important ally in that camp is Washington.

RL: Right, we should say that the United States is also currently opposed to Ukrainian membership as well.

AM: Yes, and and I think that it is very comfortable for Berlin to have Washington by its side, as in most other areas as well, when it comes to supporting Ukraine.

And I think that is one of the driving factors of Berlin's Ukraine support, is to be in what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called “lockstep” with the US. And I think in that regard as well, when it comes to Ukraine's membership, there is no difference to be found.

Apart from the lack of agreement on inviting Ukraine to join NATO, there were some other deliverables, some of which had been known prior to the summit or were sure to be announced and expected to be announced at the summit.

First and foremost, the new NATO mission to Ukraine—technically, it's not a mission—which Germany insisted on to make sure that it doesn't imply that NATO is actually on a mission in Ukraine proper. Instead, it now has a very complicated name: NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine, NSATU. Essentially that body does what the Rammstein format has done until now: coordinating weapons deliveries, arms deliveries to Ukraine, and also coordinating training activities for Ukraine's armed forces. 

The agreement to come up with such an activity comes partly down to finding a mechanism to bolster or to find a precaution in the event that the US does not continue its support for Ukraine.

That possibility obviously arises with a possible second Trump term. And I think that was one of the precautions that European allies wanted to make prior to the election in November this year. 

To bring the coordination of arms deliveries under the sort of NATO umbrella. And that is something that was not only presented at the summit, but also agreed upon. In addition, though it was already clear before the summit, NATO is now stationing a senior civilian official in Kyiv. Another sort of deliverable—and whether it is a success or not is up to interpretation—it was very likely and then confirmed in the final declaration that allies agreed to put into writing that Ukraine's membership will be irreversible. Whatever that is supposed to mean in the end is actually beyond me, because you can put many things into writing and don't necessarily have to act on them.

I think that it was another sort of political gesture towards Ukraine, but also I think a signaling towards Russia to make sure that the Kremlin sort of gets the message that NATO is still firmly supporting Ukraine, even though it does not yet dare to invite Ukraine to formally join the Alliance. 

Another deliverable amounts to allies having agreed to set aside €40 billion for Ukraine's military aid for next year, which some had argued, including the outgoing Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, to be much higher in the run up to the summit. But in the end, allies could only agree on that sum. I would say those are the most important deliverables and actions that allies could agree on with regards to supporting Ukraine, not only in the short term, but also in the longer term.

RL: Can you tell our audience a little bit about how your country, Germany, has supported Ukraine since February, 2022?

AM: I would say that measured against what Germany did prior to February 2022, not only with regard to Ukraine, but more generally speaking, with regards to its security and especially defense policies, Germany has come a very long way. Germany is now one of the biggest contributors to Ukraine in absolute terms, including military assistance, including sending lethal weapons. Even as late as January 2022, that was out of the question in Germany. I still remember, and I'm sure that many others do as well, remember the episode when the then defense minister of Germany offered to send about 5,000 helmets to Ukraine and was ridiculed for that, and I would say rightly so. Then only a few weeks later when the renewed invasion started, Germany was all of a sudden ready to send lethal weapons to Ukraine.

I would like to point out that it is not the first time Germany has sent lethal weapons into war zones. For example, Germany  supported the Kurdish Peshmerga and their fight against the Islamic State in 2013 and 2014. But when it comes to the scale and also the quality and quantity of weapons, it's really unmatched thus far. So I would say that measured against what Germany did before, it's been quite a leap.

When you consider what would be needed in order to enable Ukraine to not only resist the attack, but to actually win the war against Russia, to drive out all Russian forces, then it is not enough. But the question and one of the biggest criticisms I would direct at the current German government is that it doesn't seem to have a clear plan of what it actually wants Ukraine to do or to achieve.

Germany's Chancellor Scholz has not yet, at least not to my knowledge, uttered the words that he wants Ukraine to win. He has oftentimes said that Russia ought not to win, or put differently, that Ukraine should not lose this war. But there is no clear and identifiable path to Ukraine's victory yet that Germany has come up with over the last two and a half years. I think that is one of the biggest problems when it comes to Germany's Ukraine policy because it sort of hinders us from using the right means in order to achieve an end.

So maybe that's at least part of my interpretation of what Germany has been doing for Ukraine in the past two and a half years. I would really like to underline and emphasize that it is not the case that Germany has done nothing, far from it. Germany has done quite a lot for Ukraine.

It is after the United States, the biggest contributor, including military aid to Ukraine. But again, measured against what would be needed, not enough. That's the big question, what is the end? What does Germany want Ukraine to achieve or not? Or what does it not want Ukraine to achieve? That is sort of part of the problem, I think. Because unless you have a really clearly sketched out political goal, it is a bit difficult then to define the means to reach that goal.

RL: Right. I would say that Berlin is not alone in not clearly articulating what entails a Ukrainian victory. Washington, I think, is in a similar state of affairs.

AM: Absolutely. And again, as I mentioned before, I think Berlin is very, very glad that it is in such good company in that regard, because German Chancellor Scholz seems to be very comfortable to be in Biden's company, metaphorically speaking. Knowing that the US pursues a similar path and similar policies, I think enables Germany to better justify the actions it pursues and also the inactions of its policies.

RL: And here we are in early September, the US presidential elections taking place in less than 60 days. I want to ask you, how would the relationship between Germany and the US change if Donald Trump is reelected? And what does this mean for NATO?

AM: Well, those are two very, very important and big questions. I think it is safe to assume that bilateral relations between Germany and the US would sour dramatically if Trump were to be reelected in comparison to the rather cozy relationships Berlin enjoys with Washington at the moment, and has enjoyed for the past almost four years now. And I think relations would also be much better were the next president to be Kamala Harris. I think it is safe to assume that a Trump-led US administration will criticize Germany for not doing enough for European security, not contributing enough to NATO's burden-sharing equation. 

In some respects, even a Trump administration would be right about this because there is still a lot of room for improvement when it comes to Germany's defense policies, when it comes to Germany's readiness to actually be combat ready. However, fortunately, at least this year and most likely also in 2025, possibly in 2026, Germany can rightly point to the fact that it is in fact meeting the 2 percent goal, which might be able to sort of cushion criticism coming from a Trump administration. However, I can't tell you exactly how things would change. 

This time around I hope that decision makers and lawmakers in Germany would be more prepared than in 2016, because they have witnessed a first Trump administration and are more aware of his style of communication, and the policies that he prefers. And in the last 12 months or so, people that are said to be close to him have articulated very, very precisely what they expect European allies to do when it comes to Europe's defense, when it comes to NATO. And that obviously includes Germany. 

So I think if that is going to happen this November, at least Germany should be more prepared than last time around. What a second Trump administration would mean for NATO, that also is a bit of an open question. Again, I mentioned already that there have been people that are close to Trump reforming his foreign security and defense policy thinking, who also very clearly articulated ideas about what to do with NATO. 

One concept is a so-called dormant NATO idea, which essentially would mean that the US is only providing the nuclear deterrent for NATO, and all the rest, the conventional forces are supposed to be provided by European allies. I could very well imagine that concept being put into practice, not immediately, because those kinds of processes also take time, it would take at least a year for all US forces and infrastructure to be dismantled that are currently stationed in European countries. But I still think that we should, and by we, I mean European allies, including Germany, should brace for that option. And as it currently stands, Europe is not prepared for that, which is the sort of unfortunate aspect of that issue.

RL: Final question for you. Besides meeting the 2 percent goal in defense spending, which the allies have now come out with and said is a floor and not a ceiling in terms of defense investment in spending, what else can the European allies and Germany, as a leader of Europe, do to convince the US to stay engaged in Europe?

AM: I think it is important to understand that to a certain extent I would say the 2 percent goal seems a bit arbitrary because it is an input measure and not an output measure. At the same time, it is clear that a lot of money will be needed in order to invest in defense affairs. Especially now that the security environment that European allies, but also to a certain extent the US, finds itself in again has dramatically changed.

So in other words, it is necessary to put that money aside in order to meet the defense and deterrence pledges that allies have made, not only this year, not only in 2023 in Vilnius, not only in 2022 at the Madrid summit, but essentially since 2014. 

Because it's a continuation of developments that started in 2014 when NATO kick-started the process to rethink its deterrence and defense posture and live up to certain elements and certain promises that many European allies, including Germany, have volunteered to fulfill should be put into practice. That includes, for example, the stationing, the deployment of a combat-ready brigade, a German brigade to Lithuania, which would be a first off. Germany has promised to do that in 2022 and 2023. So it made that promise back then. And it's now in the process of scrambling together the necessary troops and equipment in order to have those troops ready by 2027.

I'm not saying that would be the sort of development or the only decision that would convince the US to remain engaged in Europe and to continue providing security and defense measures to European allies. But I think it could be one sort of possible piece to convey to the US that Europeans, including Germany, are serious about their own defense affairs and not just their own defense affairs, but actually being reliable, on living up to the promises they have made.

And there are a number of other very concrete examples, including the provision of two combat ready divisions that Germany promised to put at the disposal of NATO in 2025 and 2027.

So those are piecemeal decisions that I think could convey to the US that Germany is not only good at cheap talk, but that Germany is also good at actually delivering. And that's obviously not an exhaustive list. There are many other things that could be done in very concrete terms, but I think the list is a bit too long to be portrayed in greater detail right now. 

Just one final thought. I think what is also important, is for Germany and other European allies to be cognizant of is that the main theater of strategic priority and importance for the US is no longer in the Euro-Atlantic theater, it has been shifting to the Indo-Pacific theater. And I think at least in part mirroring and also complimenting what the US is doing in that theater could go a long way in convincing the US to also remain committed to Europe.

RL: Aylin, thank you so much for joining us today. I really appreciate the conversation.

AM: Thanks for having me.