In Conversation | Benedetta Berti
An insider's look into NATO with the Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
The following conversation was recorded on July 3, 2024 and has been edited for clarity.
Rick Landgraf: With me today is Benedetta Berti. She is the Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the NATO Secretary General. Benedetta, welcome to the show.
Benedetta Berti: Thank you, glad to be here.
RL: First, I wanted to ask you a little bit about your current role within NATO, your background, and how you came to be the Director of the Policy Planning Unit.
BB: Sure, so I've been in this current job as leading the policy planning team in the office of the Secretary General for roughly six years now. I come to this job from a background in academia, in policy research, in think tanks, and working on security policy and defense policy issues, but really from outside of government. I’ve worked as a researcher in academia, as a policy analyst in think tanks, and then also as a consultant working with different NGOs or international organizations on issues surrounding political risk, internal conflicts, and protection of civilians in non-permissive environments. So really I’ve been I would say at the intersection between geopolitics strategy and defense with a focus on broader security security issues.
I come from spending quite a bit of time looking at the Middle East. And after, I would say, roughly ten years in that context, I took a leap and decided to come to NATO. And it has been a very interesting time to join the alliance. Over the last ten years NATO really has undertaken a formidable military and political adaptation to respond to what is essentially a much more complex security environment. So in my current job I look at the broader set of geopolitical challenges and risks to the alliance in the Euro-Atlantic space, but also beyond. So it's a quite broad portfolio.
RL: And how long have you been with NATO?
BB: I joined at the end of 2017, so already in a time where the alliance was beginning to implement a fairly substantial reset of its deterrence and defense posture. That process really started in 2014 after Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, which essentially was taken by our military planners. Our military leadership has assigned many of the assumptions that had driven our understanding of security in the post-Cold War era. Namely, the absence of conventional threats to allied territory, the fact that we operated in a benign security environment, the issue that the Euro-Atlantic area was at peace, all those issues started to become questioned after Russia illegally annexed Crimea and used force to forcibly occupy and take over part of a large sovereign country on the European continent.
I came into NATO at a very already dynamic time for the Alliance, and I would say since then, unfortunately, also driven by a worsening security environment, the pace of adaptation has really exponentially grown: not just to deal with the Russian threat and with the return of full-scale conventional war in Europe, but also really to adapt to a much more complex security environment where, in addition to the Russian threat, one has to ensure that the Alliance is able to respond to a variety of other challenges from terrorism, to the rise of the People's Republic of China, to disinformation, to cyber and hybrid threats, just to name a few. So it's been six years in NATO, but I would say a very, very dynamic environment to work in, especially in my job, which really has to do with looking at strategy and big policy questions for NATO.
RL: Part of our job here in the role of this podcast series is to educate our listenership on NATO, what NATO is, what NATO isn't, the role of NATO in not only US national security, but the security of Europe overall. So if you can, can you maybe take us through what it's like to work at NATO and your typical day?
BB: I would start by saying that because it is a very dynamic security environment, really no day goes without multiple crises and conflicts and just all the different challenges that we face. That said, I think working at NATO is, first and foremost, about working in an organization made of 32 different allied countries. From a very personal perspective, it's a fantastic working environment. You're working with colleagues from all over Europe and North America side by side in a multilateral, multinational, very vibrant environment. As an alliance of 32 countries, NATO is really a political and a military organization. It has a political heart in the NATO headquarters here in Brussels, Belgium, and then it has a military structure with two main commands, one in Mons, Belgium, and the other in Norfolk, Virginia, in the United States.
And these two sides of the organization, the political and the military, really work side by side for one common purpose, which is to ensure the security of the Allies, right? To enable the collective defense of Allies, which is the core purpose of NATO as a defensive political military alliance. In terms of what it's like to work at the civilian heart of NATO, at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, I would say a lot of it is about enabling, facilitating consultation, the exchanges of information and of intelligence between the 32 allies. And really everything that you do at NATO is done through deliberations, through negotiations, through political processes that lead to consensus. So here at the headquarters, you have a North Atlantic Council, which is the main decision-making body within NATO. And that's where the 32 representatives from the 32 allies sit, chaired by the Secretary General, and they work day in and day out to find common policies, find common solutions, enable and practical responses to ensure that NATO is able to protect and to secure the alliance. Supporting this North Atlantic Council you have a lot of different committees that really work the details of every policy decision.
It's a really vibrant environment. There are a lot of negotiations, a lot of exchanges, a lot of and a lot of consultations, and really the core purpose is to find the best possible political agreement that really reflects the national security priorities of all the allies and also reflects the consensus, the agreement of the transatlantic alliance. So a typical day at NATO will see a lot of these political negotiations, a lot of consultations, a lot of exchanges. And then, of course, in the military side of the organization, it's really about implementing, exercising, delivering, and ensuring that those political decisions are implemented at the military level.
That would be NATO at a glance; then depending which part of NATO you work your day might be very different. For me, working in the office of the Secretary General, my primary job is really to provide advice, recommendations, and analysis to the Secretary General as the top civilian leadership in the organization, so that he can make the best decisions and shape the politics of the Alliance.
RL: We're talking here in early July, about a week before the NATO summit in Washington. And speaking of political agreements, negotiations, consensus building, from your view, what announcements and decisions do you anticipate NATO making at the Washington summit?
BB: Right, so indeed the Washington Summit which will occur between the 9th and the 11th of July is a very important occasion for the Alliance. First, it is the 75th Summit anniversary for NATO, which means that the Alliance has been successfully working for the past 75 years. And of course, the Summit will start by recognizing this reality, which is really formidable: It is the most enduring and stronger strongest alliance that we've had in history, so certainly there is a moment to celebrate the beginning of the summit also recognizing that this year NATO will be an alliance of 32 countries with Sweden having completed the the accessions into NATO just earlier this year.
So we start the summit with a moment of recognition of the achievements of the alliance. That said, it's not really just an anniversary summit. It's really about making practical decisions because I think our security environment really demands us to take concrete action. In terms of what will be the key topics discussed at the summit, I would say firstly it's about the continuous reset and strengthening of our deterrence and defense posture. That really means that since 2014 NATO has implemented the largest reinforcement of its deterrence and defense posture in a generation that has led the Alliance, first of all, to reverse what had been decades of underinvestment in defense and go from a situation in 2014 when only three allies spent 2 percent of their GDP on defense spending. Now at this summit in Washington we have 23 allies—so two-thirds of the alliance—spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense, which is, of course, very important to deal with a security environment that really demands us to take our deterrence and defense seriously. So firstly, it's going to be about recognizing the progress that has been made in terms of defense spending.
There are a number of decisions that are going to be taken to continue to support the adaptation of our deterrence and defense architecture. In layman's terms, we have now more forces at higher readiness available to deter and defend the alliance. We have allies that have acquired more high-end capabilities that are needed to ensure the deterrence and defense of the Alliance. I expect also at the summit, there will be additional commitment to re-energize, ramp up production, and really invest in our defense industry, which is something very important. Because again, after decades of having a just-in-time model, one where we really didn't invest in high production of our defense industry, we are now in a situation in which we really need to re-energize and strengthen the transatlantic defense industrial and technological base. So expect important decisions on those issues.
The second main issue for the Washington summit is NATO support to Ukraine and allied support to Ukraine. This is very important to NATO and to your Atlantic security at large. Ukraine is of course exercising its right to self-defense by standing up to Russian aggression. We also know that the path to future security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area goes through ensuring that Ukraine prevails as a sovereign, dependent country and that Russian aggression does not pay off. So the stakes are really high in terms of the outcome of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. So in Washington, very, very practically, I expect all allies not just to announce additional support for Ukraine, but also to agree to a new NATO security assistance and training for Ukraine, which essentially means that NATO will take a much more robust role in overseeing and coordinating the training and the security assistance that allies provide to Ukraine.
This is important to ensure predictability, sustainability, better coordination so that Ukraine has what it needs today, but also to work on the long-term development of the Ukrainian armed forces. I expect this decision will be backed by a long-term financial commitment. Again, this is important to both reassure Ukraine that we are continuing to support their self-defense, but also to signal to Moscow that the Kremlin cannot just wait us out. We will continue to support Ukraine, not as charity, but really as an investment in our core security.
I also expect allies will reiterate the future commitment to Ukraine joining and becoming a member of NATO when conditions are right. And really through all these decisions, building a concrete bridge to membership and also a concrete signal of support to Ukraine. So I expect important decisions on Ukraine at the Washington Summit.
And third, in addition to deterrence and defense support for Ukraine, an important area of work for the Washington Summit is the strengthening of NATO's partnership, especially when it comes to its global partnership and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. NATO has four main partners in the Indo-Pacific region: Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. In recent years, we have been really increasing both our political dialogue and our practical cooperation with these countries, recognizing that we have a number of important shared interests and security concerns. From cyber and hybrid threats to terrorism to really a concern over the stability of the international order. Working and continuing to step up cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners will be another important area for decisions of the summit, not in the least to respond to what we see as a world of growing strategic competition and also a world in which we see countries like the People's Republic of China playing an increasingly more enabling role in supporting Russia's world of aggression against Ukraine. So in a nutshell, I think these will be some of the main themes for the Washington summit.
RL: Regarding the partnerships that NATO has with its Indo-Pacific partners—you mentioned Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—are those partnerships bilateral partnerships, with NATO on one side and let's say Japan on the other side, or are these four Indo-Pacific countries uniting as a group and then meeting as a group with NATO on the other side? What is the structure of these relationships?
BB: Just to take a very small step back, NATO has over 35 partner countries. These are countries that are not fully fledged allies, members of the Alliance, but with whom NATO cooperates, either in a bilateral or in a regional framework basis. And these countries are in the Middle East and North Africa, in a broader eastern Eastern neighborhood, but also global partners. And in the context of global partners, we have, as you rightly stated, four countries in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. With each of these countries NATO has a bilateral and practical cooperation program, but we also have an informal setting through which we meet between NATO as an alliance, and these four countries, we call them the Indo-Pacific Four. This is also important because through these meetings we're able to have exchanges about, for example, the growing security interlinkages between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific theater. Then there are also areas of cooperation that NATO agrees to agree to carry forward with all the Indo-Pacific four countries. It's a bit of a mix. There is both bilateral cooperation with each of these countries, but there is also this setting through which we're able to consult and exchange ideas and have very, I would say, fruitful strategic exchanges that honor a more regional framework.
RL: Recently NATO announced a new Secretary General, Dutch politician Mark Rutte. He will be, I think, officially taking the helm October 1st. What do you see as the new Secretary General's main priorities and initiatives for the Alliance? And in what ways will these differ, if at all, from Secretary General Stoltenberg?
BB: Well, it's a difficult question for me to answer, of course, because for the past six years, I've had the privilege of working with the current Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, and I have not had the pleasure of meeting the upcoming Secretary General, Mark Rutte, who will take office, as you mentioned, in the fall. So I don't know exactly what his priorities and agendas will be. That certainly will be one of the first questions we will ask him when meeting him.
But I would say that in this particular security environment, I believe some of the priorities of every NATO Secretary General that really have been quite consistent over the years include one: preserving and strengthening Allied unity. This I think has been true for every Secretary General since 1949. This is because of course the center of gravity, the main strength of NATO as an alliance is the unity and solidarity between allies. Every Secretary General has the really important job of fostering unity, of doing whatever he or she can to bridge gaps and really ensure that allies are singing from the same song sheet, so to speak, when it comes to NATO priorities. So maintaining and fostering unity, I think, is going to be a priority of every Secretary General. So on safe ground, this will be a priority for the new Secretary General as well.
When the new Secretary General takes office, he will be, of course, also steering the alliance through the most significant process of military adaptation that we have had since the end of the Cold War. I expect that continuing to deliver on the reset of our deterrence and defense posture will be a priority and that means continuing to look at how to ensure fair burden sharing between European allies and North America and how to continue to strengthen not just defense spending, but also our transatlantic industrial base. I believe these priorities will remain important. I also believe that because we live in a world in which really we need to take into consideration the impact of rising strategic competition, there will be a continued desire to foster our cooperation and partnership with countries in the Indo-Pacific, but also to continue to foster transatlantic convergence when it comes to responding to the China challenge. So these are just some ideas, but I'm sure the new Secretary General will have very precise political priorities that he will communicate to us when he takes office in a few months.
RL: What do you see as NATO's biggest challenges over the next decade, looking forward to 2034? Where will NATO be in 2034? And what will its membership look like then?
BB: That's a very good question. I think that perhaps if I look at where we are today, I would say that one of the main challenges that the Alliance is dealing with is really how to operate in this world of growing strategic competition where everything is connected and everything is happening at the same time. And what I mean by it is that during the Cold War, NATO had a straightforward mission. That was, of course, to prevent conventional nuclear confrontation on the territory of allied countries and essentially had one main focus, the Euro-Atlantic theater, and one main threat, the Soviet Union. Today, I would say that we live in a much more complex world where, of course, NATO continues to have a territorial focus, continues to be a regional organization, but the reality is in order to ensure the security and defense of allies, we also have to have a global approach. And that requires understanding the interlinkages between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific theaters, for example. It also requires understanding what is the impact of the People's Republic of China's coercive policies on your Atlantic security and these are all non-traditional NATO questions but they have become I think very important and they will continue to be important into the future.
Of course we also live in a world in which we see both military and non-military tactics used in an integrated way to undermine our security. You can see this on issues such as disinformation, the use of hybrid threats, economic coercion, and that really requires the Alliance to have not just a robust deterrence and defense posture, but also a very robust approach towards resilience of its infrastructure, of its societies, of its democracies. I think the main challenge really is how do we adapt to a world in which we need to connect the dots between the kinetic and the non-kinetic, but also between the different theaters of operation. And I think that is something that NATO will continue to think about well into the future.
RL: Benedetta Berti, it's been a pleasure speaking with you today. Thanks so much for being on the show.
BB: Thank you.