In Conversation | Gwendoline Vamos

The past, present, and future of NATO's Indo-Pacific partnerships

The following conversation was recorded in November 2024 and has been edited for clarity.

Rick Landgraf: Welcome back to the Ties That Bind, NATO at 75 and Beyond, a special podcast series of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. I'm your host, Rick Landgraf. My guest today is Gwendolyn Vamos. She is the head of global partnerships in the political affairs and security policy division at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

In this capacity, she is overseeing NATO's policy and relationship with China and NATO's relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Before assuming this position, Gwen was the senior policy officer on China, and prior to that, she was responsible for NATO's bilateral relations with Russia. Before joining NATO, Gwen worked at the European Commission and in a public affairs consultancy firm in Brussels.

Gwen, thanks very much for joining me today.

Gwen Vamos: Thank you Rick. Happy to be here.

RL: Now, before we get into NATO's role in the Indo-Pacific region, NATO's various partnerships in the region, and NATO's evolving relationship with China, I'd like to ask you a little bit about your own background. So, Gwen, what inspired you to pursue a career in public service?

GV: Well, actually I started my career in the ‘90s and at university I studied Russian and Slavic studies at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. I had a desire to build something new and felt that working at NATO would actually offer me that possibility. NATO at the time was opening up to partnerships up until 1989. It had no partners. NATO was very much an inward-looking organization.

That totally changed with the Cold War, and when I started my career at the end of the ‘90s, basically, that was the perfect time to start something totally new, building a totally new relationship with Russia. And I actually worked on Russia for about 15 years altogether. For many years, it was about building the relationship, and unfortunately for some of the years, after 2014 in particular, it was about drawing down on everything that we had tried to build with Russia.

RL: So Gwen, I can't help but notice in your bio that we read at the opening of the show, you have the unique perspective of working both at NATO, however, you were also with the European Commission, which is the executive arm of the European Union. In what ways are these international organizations, and in what ways are they similar in your view?

GV: Well, they're actually quite different in the way they work. The European Union is a very centralized organization in the European Commission and that was in the ‘90s—we're talking a long time ago. It was also a very centralized vertical system but with many, many different responsibilities. And my responsibility was extremely specific. I was working on a technical assistance program for the post-Soviet space. When I arrived at NATO, I found a very different organization, a much more horizontal organization, a much more Anglo-Saxon organization, and a much smaller organization. The international staff at NATO is about 1,200 people. I think this is less than one directorate general at the European Commission. So these are very, very different organizations.

What has struck me at NATO from the very beginning is the fact that we work by consensus and that we really work day by day to build that consensus among the different allies. So these are different organizations, but I have to admit that my experience at the European Commission was rather limited in comparison to the number of years I have spent now working here at NATO.

RL: One of the things that struck me was the fact that, as you say, NATO is a consensus organization. All major decisions require a unanimous agreement among the now 32 allies, particularly membership decisions, decisions to invite new countries to join the Alliance.

And yet at the same time it's also a horizontal organization to a certain extent, where it's a bit flatter, Anglo-Saxon led in some respects. So for me there's this tension, there's this consensus on the one hand and yet also a US leadership role on the other hand, which kind of makes for an interesting dynamic within the Alliance.

GV: But I think indeed the fact that we need to have consensus on every decision is really a key element of NATO. So it's not just on some decisions that are more important than others: on every decision we need consensus by allies. NATO is an intra-government organization.

So this is really at the core of the organization. What makes it special is that we are all in the same building, the international staff, the international military staff, but also all the allied representation to NATO.

So that really helps actually building the connections because we are in the same building every day, which facilitates a lot of the informal consultation that we need ahead of the more formal committee meetings where we negotiate formally and we have to make decisions altogether. I want to insist on the fact that NATO doesn't equate the United States. The United States doesn't equate NATO. It's an organization of 32 allies. Specifically on my comment on the Anglo-Saxon way, I feel this was more related to the way we work in general in terms of being a less hierarchical organization.

RL: That's a fascinating perspective that you bring to the table. Shifting a bit to the heart of the matter, you are currently overseeing NATO's policy in relationship with China and also NATO's relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

From your perspective, what is NATO's current role in the Indo-Pacific region?

GV: I think it's important to start by underlining that NATO is and will remain a regional organization, which is an alliance focused on protecting its members in the Euro-Atlantic area. This is what we are meant to do by the Washington Treaty, which was signed in 1949. So there are clearly treaty limitations. That's one thing.

After the end of the Cold War, as I mentioned earlier, we have developed a network of partnerships and we now have about 35 partners. And among those partners, we have four in the Pacific region. And the notion of building security through establishing partnerships with other countries is really at the core of NATO now. It's really how NATO goes about its business. This is something that has been recognized after the Cold War through the adoption of one of NATO's core ties, which we call cooperative security. So during the Cold War, it was all about collective defense. But after the Cold War, we added more core tasks and one of them is cooperative security and this is where our partnership network fits.

Now in terms of the Indo-Pacific more specifically, this is a relatively new notion to NATO. But this is something that has now sort of been established on NATO's agenda. The former Secretary General, Stoltenberg, who's just stepped down used to say what happens indeed in the Indo-Pacific matters for Europe and what happens in Europe matters for the Indo-Pacific. But this notion of a link between the two regions has been mentioned for the first time only two years ago when we published our new strategic concept in 2022. So this is a very, very recent notion here at NATO.

I think we recognize that security is global. We are regional. That's our mandate: to protect European and allied territories. But we need to have a global outlook. We need to be well-connected. Challenges are global. They know no borders, and we need to better understand challenges coming from outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. And we have developed, over the years, very strong partnerships with four partners that we have in the Indo-Pacific and with which we are seeking to expand our interaction at all levels. We are seeking to increase cooperation where we have common interests, where we have shared security challenges,

We want to be able to talk about it. We want to be able to assess, set those challenges together, and potentially work together on how to address those challenges. But it is not about NATO moving into the Indo-Pacific. This is not about NATO moving military assets into the Indo-Pacific. This is not about NATO becoming a security provider in the Pacific.

RL: And as you mentioned, the four countries in the Indo-Pacific region that NATO has formed partnerships with—these are New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea—does NATO meet with them on a one versus 32 basis, or is it as a group of four? How is that partnership structured?

GV: So we have long-standing partnerships with the four of them. And these have started as purely bilateral partnerships. Like I said, this notion of the Indo-Pacific region or the IP4, as we often say in shorthand, is relatively recent for NATO. So we started these partnerships for some of them back in the ‘90s.

And they have developed at different paces. For example, with Australia, Japan, and Korea, we have developed a very strong operational interaction. We needed to have an operation in Afghanistan.

Then after the withdrawal of the ISAF mission, not the withdrawal from Afghanistan altogether, we started to develop political dialogue, in particular with Japan, and with Australia. So these relationships have their own pace. They're different. These are two very different partners. The relationships that we develop there are what we call interest-driven. So it's based on a common interest between NATO and, let's say, Japan, for example, and on that basis we develop a cooperation program with them.

Now the notion of the Indo-Pacific and the sort of a grouping, which is not a formal grouping here at NATO, appeared around 2017 only. And the first discussion we had at the time was linked to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Then this notion or this sort of grouping started to develop.

And we started to, in addition to meeting these partners on a bilateral basis, meet them as a group. And there has been an acceleration since 2017 and in particular, after COVID, basically, when these meetings not only were organized at the level of the North Atlantic Council and the level of permanent representatives, but were also elevated to ministerial meetings or to summit meetings with our leaders. And there were the four leaders of Australia, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand with us last July in Washington when natives celebrated the 75th anniversary. So these are two important tracks: There's a bilateral track and then there's the IP4 track that we will continue to develop as we move forward. But I don't want to say that one track is more important than the other.

RL: These partnerships grew out of concern with North Korea, security concerns, obviously with the Korean Peninsula and with South Korea, and yet also other concerns in the region and the increasing geopolitical competition between the United States and China. How does NATO factor into that increasing competition in the region?

GV: Again, NATO is not the United States. NATO is just a tool that is used by allies. And in the case of the increasing geopolitical competition between the US and China, to us what has been important over the last five years is to understand whether China's policies, China's actions can affect Atlantic security. And you always have to remember, this is our task, basically. It is your Atlantic security. This is what NATO is meant to do: look at the security in the Euro-Atlantic space.

What we have done over the last five years since 2019 is that we have started to look more deeply at how China can impact our own security here. So we can use NATO as a transatlantic platform to discuss, to understand China, to discuss it together, to build a common picture, which is very important, and to have a common assessment. And on that basis, see whether there are areas where NATO should respond to some of the actions or some of the challenges that China is posing to us. We are just one actor. There are many different actors in this, of course, for example, also the European Union.

RL: And in what ways are China's actions affecting your Atlantic security? Can you point to a few cases or a few examples of how China's behavior is having an effect in Europe?

GV: Sure. I think we are looking at, in particular now, the key issue for us: China's deepening strategic partnership with Russia and the support that China is providing to Russia's defense industry. And we consider that it's a decisive enabler, actually, of Russia's ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. So that is a key issue for us, how China is supporting Russia in the political sphere with material support, with economic support, and with dual-use goods support that can also be used in the context of Ukraine. That is one key area of concern. We are also watching how China is increasingly being assertive in using economic coercion to create strategic dependencies. We're looking at how it very aggressively asserts its illegitimate maritime claims, and how it is interfering with democratic and academic institutions.

And importantly for NATO, we are looking at how China is rapidly developing military capacity and capabilities without transparency. And that includes the nuclear arsenal. And there I want to emphasize that we are not concerned about the fact that China is modernizing. I think we all do that, but we are concerned in particular by the lack of transparency. There are many other areas that I could mention. For example, China's attempt to shape new technological norms and standards attempts to dominate new technologies such as AI and quantum. So there are a number of issues. What is important now at NATO is that, while five years ago, we had no discussion of China and NATO. Today, considerations of China are well embedded into NATO's work.

RL: Right. And I must say that also, as you mentioned earlier, what happens in the Indo-Pacific matters for the Euro-Atlantic. One specific example of this in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine is the employment of North Korean troops now in the Kursk counter-offensive in Eastern Ukraine.

The estimates vary as to how many troops may be there from maybe 3,000 upwards to maybe 10,000. And whether or not North Korea's employment of troops there by Russia is a sign of weakness on the part of Russia. But as you mentioned, this specific case really shows how security in one region is so tied to security in another region as you say and as NATO says.

GV: Absolutely, I think it's a striking example. If anybody needed proof that the security of the two regions is interlinked, well, they have it now with the DPRK. And it goes both ways. It goes with the North Korean troops being in Russia now, and these are combat troops.

But it is also about what North Korea gets in return from Russia, especially when it comes to technology. And that is going to also have a destabilizing effect on the Indo-Pacific. So we are extremely concerned by this increasing DPRK-Russia military cooperation. It has had, even before the North Korean combat troops arrived in Russia,

It has had a devastating effect in Ukraine on the battlefield already. And we think that there's a role for China to play there. And we would hope that China would use some of its leverage on the DPRK to stop this.

RL: I want to shift gears a little bit to the making of NATO's official statements. And our readers would be well aware that NATO's official statements constitute a common operating picture of the 32 allies. These are consensus statements. So obviously all allies need to agree on the specific verbiage.

With your experience there working at NATO and especially in, helping to put together the 2022 strategic concept. How has NATO's official language about China, how has this evolved over the years from your point of view?

GV: So, actually, if you take all the statements we've done on China since 2019, you have a very clear picture of the evolution. 2019 was the first time we ever mentioned China in a NATO statement. Indeed, the NATO statement is basically the agreed policy of NATO. These are the guiding documents for NATO. In 2019, we referred to China being a challenge, but also offered opportunities. In 2021, the second time, we mentioned China and that was during COVID. The language got stronger, and that is our experience of COVID, in particular the disinformation piece during COVID.

You could see that allies were ready to say things publicly about China that they were not ready to say in 2019. So you already have a sort of a picture of where allies stand in 2021. It already refers to coercion. It already refers to disinformation. It refers to the military buildup or the opaque military buildup, for example.

And then comes the strategic concept one year later in the summer of 2022. And that's a very important moment because it's already five months into the war, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. And the support that China brings to Russia from the very, very start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has drastically impacted the perception that allies have of China. And so for the first time in 2022—and we adopt a strategic concept every 10 to 12 years—you have a very clear policy in terms of how NATO approaches China. The policy is basically that on the one hand, we will continue to engage with China. We no longer talk about opportunities, that notion has been lost, but we continue to try to engage constructively. But at the same time, we have a series of concerns, and these are related to some of the issues I've raised before.

But this text of the strategic concept is basically the baseline for NATO's approach to China. Allies have also identified three baskets of how it should address China. And one of them is engagement, one of them is more awareness, so a better understanding of China, and the third one is about building our own resilience. And it's actually the one where we need to continue to work more vigorously over the next year.

If you move then from the strategic concept to the Washington Declaration, which was issued in July this year, you will see that the language on China is very much also focused on the fact that it is a decisive neighbor of Russia's war against Ukraine. That is the most important piece of the Washington Declaration. And what is interesting in that context is that allies have identified a number of neighbors, one of them being also the DPRK. So a clear evolution in only a few years and it’s very striking how fast NATO, which was an organization that had not discussed China before, came to a consensus position on how to approach China here.

RL: Gwen, a final question here. We're speaking now in mid-November, about a week after the US elections. Donald Trump has been reelected as president and will be inaugurated later in January of next year. What is the initial reaction in the halls of NATO headquarters about Donald Trump coming back to the White House?

GV: Well, for us, the cornerstone remains the Washington Treaty, and we expect that the United States will continue to work on that basis. Change of governments happens in all countries. We are an alliance of democracy, so we quite choose to deal with the change of government.

Now, of course, we know from the first Trump administration some of the topics that would be at the forefront of their agenda. Obviously, there's defense spending or fair burden sharing, which has been a point that President Trump at the time made very forcefully. I think he's going to find an organization that is very different from the one he found in 2016 at the time. Three allies only were meeting the 2 percent GDP in terms of defense spending. And we now have 23 allies meeting that 2 percent. So I think there's more that needs to be done and more will be done, but we are moving in the right direction and obviously Ukraine has also pushed us in that direction.

The other item indeed that we think would be on the agenda of the new US administration is China. Also on this one, I think we are in good shape. When President Trump left the White House in 2020, we were just starting our work on China. As I mentioned before, it's now been embedded into NATO's agenda. This is a standing item here at NATO, so he will also find a very different organization when it comes to China.

RL: Certainly from China to Ukraine to defense investment, there are a lot of items on NATO's agenda as we move from 2024 into 2025. Gwen, thanks so much for talking with me today on the Ties That Bind.

GV: Thank you.