In Conversation | Ian Langford

Examining NATO's Partnership with Australia

The following conversation was recorded in November 2024 and has been edited for clarity.

Rick Landgraf: Welcome back to the Ties That Bind, NATO at 75 and Beyond, a special podcast series of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Today we're talking about NATO's relations with one of its partners in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia. NATO has structured partnerships with Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand in the region. Joining us today is Ian Langford.

Ian is a retired senior military officer from the Australian Defense Force. He has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Timor-Leste, Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands, as well as on domestic counter-terrorism duties. He is now an academic at the University of New South Wales. Ian, welcome to the show today.

Ian Langford: Thanks very much. I appreciate being here to talk about such an important topic.

RL: So NATO and Australia have had a relationship for a long time. Australia is a close partner of NATO and NATO Allies. Can you talk to us a little bit about when the partnership was established and how it has developed over the years?

IL: NATO's partnership with Australia throughout the early part of its history was more or less based on Australia's military alliance with the United States commonly known as ANZUS or the Australian New Zealand US Security Treaty. That was pretty much the forum in which Australia more or less indirectly contributed to NATO's greater role in that Cold War context so we saw through ANZUS the establishment of what eventually became the rules-based global order in the post-Bretton Woods 20th century.

But that relationship really changed in the period after the attacks of September 11, 2001, which resulted in Australia's contribution to commitments in Afghanistan under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) regime, which was clearly led by NATO, resulting in formal dialogue and cooperation, the first being in June 2012. NATO and Australia became partners for peace, essentially, and that cooperation evolved into what's currently known as the individual partnership and cooperation program.

Australia supports NATO in many areas, ISAF in Afghanistan being the most obvious in historical context. But since its commitment to Afghanistan, that security framework has now evolved. As the Indo-Pacific sort of becomes more acknowledged by many its role in global power politics and the future of the world, frankly, necessitates a security framework that extends beyond just those that we formed in the Afghanistan years and in the outer years of the last decade. So what we see now is a really enhanced focus on how NATO and Australian relations can uphold what we again commonly refer to as rules-based international order.

There are areas of interest and priority with cyber defense, hybrid non-traditional threats, even just virtues and the value of bringing a values-based system to security frameworks to include women, peace, and security, as well as the impact of technology on the security sector and what it might mean for military and non-military threats.

Australia's relationship with NATO has now diversified beyond merely security commitments into a much more complex and capable framework, which does reflect the security environment that we're now all operating in.

And I just want to highlight a really good and apparent example of that: the nexus between security in North Asia and security in Europe manifesting in the war in Ukraine, where we now see reports of North Korean soldiers joining Russian forces in that theater in Europe.

And that's a really obvious example of the security interdependencies between the area that is traditional to NATO and the North Atlantic Alliance more broadly, but also now the spreading impacts and influences of a global security system where an event somewhere might mean actions anywhere. And so what that necessitates is for Australia and NATO to broaden their relationship to think about the security state we now live in and the cause and effect requirement for us to be much broader in our focus and quite fulsome in its application.

RL: You mentioned reports this week and going back a little bit further about North Korean troop involvement in the Ukraine war, and that really helps us understand how these two theaters are so interconnected, the European theater and the Indo-Pacific theater, and the risk that this war in Ukraine may expand even further.

I wanted to ask you a little bit about Australia and its role in supporting NATO-led operations and missions. Of course, Australia was one of the largest non-NATO troop contributors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Can you tell us a little bit about what Australia contributed to that mission and what unique capabilities Australia brings to the table with supporting NATO operations and missions?

IL: Absolutely. Many of your listeners would be aware that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Australia invoked its Article 4 provisions of ANZUS, which is commonly sort of understood as an attack on one is an attack on all and so in the early phases of the Afghanistan response led by the United States—really commencing on around 17 to 18 October, 2001, Australia was a troop contributor to that effort which saw the collapse of the Taliban.

And then as that mission evolved over the coming years into what would eventually become ISAF, led by NATO, Australia's commitment to ongoing security, its obligations to bring security to Afghanistan—but think about the global war on terror and more broadly—saw it, as a partner for peace, really extend its commitment to the levels that your question indicated. So by the mid to late 2006-2008, we had what constituted essentially a brigade in the Uruzgan Province area, as well as contributions to various training schools, to ISAF headquarters itself, and to many of the military supply lines of communication in and out of that country. And so our contribution was focused on security effects in and around Uruzgan, but also some of the niche capabilities that we're able to provide in command and control, in logistics, in training, that meant that we were committed to that theater in all sorts of ways. And of course, that commitment ran all the way through to the end of the ISAF-led, sort of combat operations around the 2013 to 2014 period, then obviously we were there during the catastrophe of the eventual withdrawal and the end of that campaign.

So Afghanistan became, I think, really a metaphor for the interdependencies between NATO and Australia and again the security impacts and effects of issues such as Afghanistan. But also around that period, we had counter-piracy operations in and around the Red Sea, we worked together on countering threat finance and the lethal aid network of money and illegal gain to facilitate security threats, both traditional and non-traditional. And so now we have what was an Afghanistan commitment maturing into a better understanding of global security issues, a real focus on enhancing our interoperability between NATO and Australia, and thinking about what resilience means for example in the modern world when it comes to the security frameworks that need to bring security and meet our security obligations both in the North Atlantic but also in the Asia Pacific.

RL: Right. You mentioned the niche capabilities and I recall I was in Afghanistan in 2013, 2014, supporting counter threat finance and counternarcotics missions specifically with the Special Operations Task Forces over there. And I recall that the Australians brought quite a large contingent to that and supported that effort seamlessly with US Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements and across ISAF. I saw firsthand the level of professionalism and teamwork that Australia provided to that mission, so definitely a great partner in that operation.

IL: I mean, again, it was a really important moment, I think, in the maturing and the evolution of the Australian Defence Force. So, we have four structured determinants—which are a fancy way of describing what our priorities are around how we design and resource forces, and how we give them their sort of mandate as well—and in the context of Afghanistan, our earlier commitments with the Americans were under their command and control framework, which a lot of which involve special forces. As you indicate, I was actually on the staff of NSOC Alpha and the NATO Special Operations Component Command (NSOC) which established itself in Kabul in about, if my memory serves me well, the back-end of 2007, moving into 2008, which became ISAF SOF and eventually became Sujidif Alpha towards the back end.

RL: A lot of acronyms there.

IL: There is, so again, ISAF SOF being obvious in the context. The NSOC Alpha was the NATO Special Operations Component Command, which established itself as a functional headquarters in Afghanistan in 2008.

And then by the time we got to 2012, 2013, it had evolved once more into the Special Operations Joint Task Force Afghanistan, so JTAF Alpha, which was ISAF SOF plus another command and control framework to bring into line some of the command and control changes across theater more broadly.

So, that framework of which Australia was part of really since late 2001, which sort of bound ISAF SOF in this instance and Australian Special Operations contributions together, really demonstrated the potential of the relationship and I think is a pretty good framework to think about how we might do things in the future.

RL: Turning to the war in Ukraine, Australia has supported that effort quite a bit. Can you talk about how Australia is helping Ukraine defend itself with lethal and non-lethal aid and maybe some other areas of cooperation that our listeners may not know about?

IL: Sure. Well, Australia, like the United States, the United Kingdom, and many of the NATO nations, was quick to condemn Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Our aid began with material and equipment with Australia, at certain points, being the largest non-NATO contributor in that respect. That contribution by mid-to-late 2022 turned into a commitment to train Ukrainian military forces predominantly out of the United Kingdom and an internet search would provide your listeners with the opportunity to review that commitment in detail. That training effort with the United Kingdom has been ongoing.

RL: To clarify, these are Ukrainian soldiers, Ukrainian forces traveling to the United Kingdom and then being trained by Australian advisors, right?

IL: Exactly, that's right. There's a rotation of Ukrainian soldiers that rotate through the United Kingdom and with the United Kingdom, Australia contributes to a training and force generation mission to be able to upskill those troops and then send them back into theater with the skills, knowledge, and attributes to be able to perform ground combat operations as well as many of the enabling skills so important for combined arms.

That training mission began in mid-to-late 2022, is ongoing, and has been quite successful and I think it is valued by the Ukrainians. We've got a very active Ukrainian ambassador to Australia who is often speaking really complimentary of Australia's effort to train Ukrainian forces in the United Kingdom in that respect.

In terms of equipment, a lot of that equipment, which includes some of our marquee capabilities: so Australia's Bushmaster-protected vehicle.

RL: What's the Bushmaster?

IL: The Bushmaster is essentially a protected mobility vehicle that can put six to eight people in the back and provides motorized capability, which has been essential to Australia's conventional commitments to pretty much every theater it's been involved in since the War on Terror. So that vehicle is quite modern and combat-proven based on its history and demonstrated performance.

And it's been donated to the Ukrainians to which they've found huge amounts of value and they talk about that quite well. Australia has also donated armored fighting vehicles, so it has donated its most upgraded M1 on three series, which again when you compare it to sort of what the Russians are feeling, it's very, very capable and has been demonstrated as an important part of their combined arms team.

And then most recently, Australia has donated its M1A1 Abrams tanks, which again, like many European partners and like the Americans are now on their way to Ukraine to bring that firepower, maneuver, and mobility support to Ukrainian forces, which again are so critical, particularly in the context of conducting any sort of offensive maneuver, which may or may not be in Ukraine's future war-fighting plans.

In addition to that vehicle and important kinetic capability contribution, Australia has also had elements of its defense industry donate time and energy as well as capability to the fight, so that comes in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), targeting technologies. We've had ammunition that's been produced and gifted to the Ukrainians, and that defense industry connection with the Ukrainian defense industry is ongoing. I suspect it's now maturing to a point where we are relied upon to provide much of those consumables that the Ukrainians depend on to do things like inform their Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) picture through effectively disposable UAVs all the way through to the training of their leaders in command and control and military planning so that they can conduct their future operations in ways that are consistent with what we understand to be superior to the Russians, notwithstanding the challenges that they currently face.

RL: Right. Speaking of the defense industry and joint production, are there any ongoing efforts between Australia and any NATO partners as far as joint production?

You mentioned munitions and the munitions and supplying of the 155 millimeter to Ukraine has been a big part of the war effort. Is there any joint production there?

IL: Well, there is joint production in terms of working toward a unified effort: 155s are really an example of that. And certainly, I think globally, everyone is struggling to produce enough of that munition type: A, to replace their inventories in terms of what's been gifted, but B, I think in recognition that whilst we went through the ‘90s and there was much sort of zeitgeist around revolutions in military affairs, that we depleted or took our eye off the important contribution that mass and suppression make to the combined arms battlefield.

We've learned that lesson through this experience that the age of artillery as a key determinant to being able to do offensive ground operations has not gone away. Certainly, there's been a lot of back and forth between NATO officials, US officials, and Australia in terms of its war-making capacity.

And the 155mm is a really good example of that. As I said, the other has been things like the Sypaq UAVs—and I don't want to oversimplify the technology because it's quite sophisticated—but effectively they are cardboard UAVs with sensor suites on them that are often attritable given the missions and profiles that they undertake, but because of the nature of their construction are pretty easily replaced. So their uses are consumable in opposition to some of the large, complex, and few assets that if you lose them are really hard to replace.

As the character of conflict in that theater lifts and shifts to recognize opportunity I think we've got the defense industry here, and certainly policymakers, pretty agile in their approach to being able to help the Ukrainians as the demand requires it. And you're seeing that through some of these novel technologies that are coming in. But at the end of the day, where I think the Ukrainians find themselves is that the big battalions and mass and maneuver still count. And so that's why I think I wouldn't understate the importance of those contributions around armor,

around artillery shells, and around training soldiers to be able to get tempo relative to others so that again the Ukrainians are at least capable of an offensive operation come the other side of winter and over winter can defensively hold their own in the context of what we expect to be an ongoing conflict in the east of that country.

RL: Turning now to the Indo-Pacific theater and Australia's role in the increasing US-China competition. Previously, in this episode, we talked with some guests about what NATO is doing in the Indo-Pacific and specifically what allies are doing in the Indo-Pacific. There have been reports this year of an Italian carrier strike group moving into the Indo-Pacific doing exercises there. There's news about the British doing something similar. I saw just this past week that a New Zealand vessel went through the Taiwan Strait.

So there are NATO partners, it seems, doing more things in the Indo-Pacific as a way to check China's ambitions and aggression in the area. Obviously, geography matters here. Australia is in the Indo-Pacific, it's an Indo-Pacific nation. What is Australia's perspective on this US-China competition we see in that region? What has Australia been doing to help counter Chinese aggression there?

IL: I think in answering that question, it's important to give context to your listeners in terms of how diplomacy and multilateralism work or don't work in the Asia Pacific. So many would be familiar with historic efforts to build a NATO-like alliance in this part of the world throughout the Cold War—so the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was one example of that—which resulted in it not being very effective. Out of that, through ASEAN and some of the other alliance and diplomacy frameworks, this convention around non-interference has been largely agreed to in the context of how countries relate to one another and manage their security affairs in the period really since the end of the Cold War.

So non-interference means that countries more or less mind their business and don't get involved too much. Now if you read the NATO Charter and understand the importance of collective security, it's difficult to reconcile that in the world in which we now live. So what is clear as an opportunity for NATO in this part of the world is some leadership and I think some frameworks in terms of how security dialogues and structures might move going forward. Some people wouldn't be aware that Japan's closest neighbor in terms of distance is Russia.

And so Japan is also a NATO partner in the Indo-Pacific region, as indeed are Korea, New Zealand, and Australia in the frameworks that we've previously described. So to see a NATO dimension to the Indo-Pacific is very welcome. The opportunity for NATO members to contribute to collective security through increasing presence, through maritime patrolling, and through things like Exercise Talisman Sabre (which is run in Australia every two years). Typically that exercise was a bilateral capability demonstrated, focused on interoperability between Australia and the United States. But it's now also drawing in other partners, Japan is one such, but also other NATO members. So you've got the French who put the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group through the Malacca Strait some years ago and also attended the Shangri-La dialogue in the same way.

As I understand, next year, the UK Carrier Strike Group will be in the Pacific and will be able to demonstrate the UK's ability for power projection beyond the North Atlantic. And to your point about enforcing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, we see a lot of NATO members contributing to that security framework, Italy being one, New Zealand as a NATO partner being another.

Australia regularly patrols those waterways. And so as we see the return of great power competition to East Asia and North Asia, we see NATO respond to it. And it's not just the US-China dynamic, albeit it's probably the most significant element at play when we talk about security, maritime security, and the future of the relationship between great powers in the Pacific Ocean. But having NATO there as another check and balance against rogue states and hostile powers, including the North Koreans obviously, is significant.

Giving confidence to Asian partners that they can be part of security frameworks by using NATO as an example is another way, I think, of being able to collectively respond to the changing security environment. So having NATO members in the Indo-Pacific demonstrating capability as a deterrent, recognizing the threat streams and the interdependencies between security in the North Atlantic and Europe more broadly and the Indo-Pacific—again, the Indo-Asia Pacific by definition begins from the high watermark of the East Coast of Africa and extends to the West Coast of the United States. It's a huge area and the interests of many NATO members are obvious in that respect. So having them in the region, contributing to collective security, providing a deterrent effect, providing that reassuring presence to non-NATO partners, and demonstrating what collective security might look like is an important contribution they're making right now.

RL: Ian thanks so much for being on the show today. I really appreciate it.

IL: No problems at all. All the very best to you and your listeners.